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GIGA Working Papers stubbornly resisted mounting pressure from the US and the countries of the European Union in the early 1990s to liberalize and introduce multiparty elections. The US Congress sent a clear signal in 1990 when it tied the continuation of aid to improvements in Malawi's human rights record. However, it was only when the US and other donors actually froze $70 million in development aid in May 1992 that Banda's regime finally consented. When the military, the most important instrument of repression, withdrew its support for Banda, he was forced to call a national referendum that set the stage for multiparty elections in 1993, which, in turn, removed him from office (Posner 1995 ).
Malawi's long-time ruler was not willing to react to threats, but he did respond to imposed sanctions, which had the potential to immediately harm the donor-dependent country.
Although there have clearly also been cases where international sanctions have not been successful, the Malawian case is one example in which sanctions have induced democratization in the post-Cold War era.
The end of the Cold War initiated a dramatic period of global democratization. The democratic regime type went from an empirical anomaly in the 1980s to a global norm in the 1990s. As the democratic regime type spread across the world (Huntington 1991) , the international community more forcefully voiced concerns about violations of democratic norms in authoritarian regimes around the globe.
The European Union and the United States have frequently implemented sanctions against authoritarian regimes in order to pressure these regimes to democratize (Cox and Drury 2006) . Despite the fact that the UN cannot openly aim for regime change (Chapter VII), it has frequently used sanctions to achieve democratization. This paper asks whether economic, political, military and diplomatic sanctions on the part of the UN, the US and the EU have contributed to the process of democratization since the end of the Cold War and, more importantly, whether sanctions specifically intended to achieve democratization in targeted countries have generally been successful.
In this paper we argue that the effect of imposed sanctions is strongly related to the expected costs of conceding to the sender's goals. In authoritarian regimes, conceding to demands for democratization is especially costly. As authoritarian regimes rely on means such as vote rigging, media censorship or the suppression of the opposition to stay in power, autocrats cannot concede to democratic sanctions at the threat stage without jeopardizing their own political survival. Therefore, they may prefer to bear the consequences of costly sanctions rather than democratize, expecting that not all sanctions will succeed at destabilizing the political system.
In the empirical section we introduce a new global data set of sanctions from the UN, the US and the EU that covers the period 1990-2010. The data set is used in a number of crosssectional time-series regression models to assess the impact of different forms of sanctions on democratization in authoritarian regimes in the post-Cold War era. Contrary to the research on earlier time periods, we find that sanctions have not had a generally negative effect in the post-Cold War era. In contrast, the models show that all sanctions had a generally positive, yet insignificant effect on democratic development in authoritarian countries. More importantly, the analysis shows a significantly positive effect for sanctions explicitly intended to promote democratization. In a supplementary test we show that democratic sanctions are more likely than other types of sanctions to lead to change in leadership and change in regime type, making them particularly costly for autocratic incumbents.
The paper proceeds as follows. After discussing the changed global environment for sanctions since the end of the Cold War, we discuss the importance of sanctions' goals for the democratic outcome (Section 2). We then present the data and research design in Section 3, followed by the discussion of empirical results and the supplementary test on sanctions and regime stability in Section 4. The conclusion discusses the implications of our findings.
Sanctions and the Changed Global Environment after the Cold War
The existing research has hardly reflected on how the end of Cold War antagonism between the Western and the Eastern blocs created new conditions for the operation of sanctions (Collins 2009a (Collins , 2009b . This is surprising given the profound shifts attributed to this global watershed in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall (most explicitly Fukuyama 1992) .
Generally, the structural attributes of the international system have become more favorable for democratization. The confrontation between two poles, each of which aimed to defend and enlarge its area of influence, has been replaced by unipolar US dominance of the international system. For some time, there seemed to be no economic, political or ideological alternative to the democratic and capitalist model of the West (Diamond 2000; Levitsky and Way 2010) . In addition, the US and its allies have become far more assertive than during the Cold War in actively promoting democracy at the global level (Burnell 2000; Carothers 1999 ).
Consequently, "Western liberalism's triumph" (Levitsky and Way 2002: 61) has induced the global spread of democracy and of the institution of elections, even in authoritarian regimes (Lindberg 2009; Schedler 2006) . Although the introduction of elections in many new countries has often not led to liberal democracy, it has opened up new avenues for political contestation (e.g. Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Howard and Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006) .
Second, the end of the Cold War antagonism has been accompanied by ever-increasing global economic, political, technological, communicative and social linkages (on the concept of linkage see Levitsky and Way 2010: 43-50 (Jentleson 2000: 156) .
Second, the United States, the European Union and -to some extent -the United Nations have increasingly used sanctions to strengthen democracy and human rights globally. More than 50 percent of all the sanctions directed towards autocratic regimes recorded in the new global data set on post-Cold War sanctions (see below) explicitly aim to bring about democratization in the authoritarian countries targeted. According to Collins (2009a: 77) , for the US the "most frequent factor for the initiation of economic sanctions was to foster democracy in states abroad." In cases such as Guatemala (1993), the US was able to swiftly forge an international coalition that imposed sanctions in reaction to President Serrano's decision to dissolve Congress and the judiciary (Christensen Bjune and Petersen 2010; Crawford 2001: 194) .
Third, sanctions became more targeted during the 1990s, a fact that the research to date has not adequately reflected. As a consequence of the devastating humanitarian effects of the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq in the early 1990s, senders now almost exclusively utilize targeted sanctions (Drezner 2011) . In contrast to comprehensive sanctions, which treat nations as unitary actors, these measures target particular individuals or groups (for an overview Biersteker et al. 2005) . However, existing research has rarely analyzed the specific effects that targeted sanctions exert on the power base in autocratic countries subjected to them (Brzoska 2001; Cortright and Lopez 2002; Drezner 2011; Eriksson 2011; Peksen and Drury 2010; Tostensen and Bull 2002) .
The Effectiveness of Sanctions and Their Effect on Democratization
Sanctions have a bad reputation. Hufbauer et al. (1990 Hufbauer et al. ( , 2007 , who have compiled the most extensive data set on economic sanctions to date, found that these coercive measures were successful only in one-third of all cases (for a similar assessment see Cortright and Lopez 2000) . Sanctions which specifically aim for regime destabilization or democratization show a similar success score of 31 percent (Hufbauer et al. 2007: 158-159 ).
However, these findings are heavily contested. Most authors (Drury 1998; Pape 1997 Pape , 1998 maintain that the success of sanctions is overstated, as Hufbauer et al.'s bivariate approach does not allow for the assessment of other plausible explanations for changes in target states' behavior (Askari et al. 2003; Bonetti 1991; Haass 1998; Jing et al. 2003; cf. also Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992) . 2 Traditionally, the research has focused on the interaction between sanction sender and target (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Hufbauer et al. 2007 ); less attention has been given to the internal dynamics in the target country and the repercussions of sanctions on the rulers' power bases. This is a key reason for the ambiguous or even contradictory results of early sanctions research.
It is important to acknowledge the difference between the economic and political costs of sanctions and, in turn, that economic costs do not necessarily translate into political costs for targeted authoritarian regimes. According to the traditional "punishment theory" (Lektzian and Souva 2007: 850) , the economic harm caused by sanctions directly translates into political pressure, which forces the ruler to comply. A certain level of deprivation induces citizens to challenge the current regime (Kerr and Gaisford 1994) . In other words, "the greater the cost of sanctions to the target, the greater the likelihood they will succeed" (Drury 1998: 508) . As early as 1967, Galtung (1967) contemptuously termed these expectations the "naive theory of sanctions." In all regimes, "the key to sanctions success is to generate political costs for the target regime's winning coalition" (Lektzian and Souva 2007: 867) . detailed and systematic analysis (see Drury and Li 2006; Hufbauer et al. 2007: 55-64; Lektzian and Souva 2007) . We take it as axiomatic that actors in a position of power want to retain this position (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) and that the highest cost to autocratic leaders is the destabilization of their rule through democratization, regime change or the removal of rulers (Marinov 2005) .
The Importance of Sanction Goals for Democratic Outcomes
As discussed in the previous section, the existing research has generally shown a rather low success rate for economic sanctions. To explain this general ineffectiveness, a growing number of authors have suggested that it is problematic to look only at actually imposed sanctions (Drezner 1999 (Drezner , 2003 Lacy and Niou 2004; Morgan et al. 2009 ). According to these scholars, it is likely that the cases where sanctions would be most effective end as early as the threat stage. If a regime judges the expected cost of sanctions to be high or even regimethreatening, it will concede to the sender's demands before the sanction is actually put in place. Measuring only the effect of actually imposed sanctions therefore introduces a significant selection bias to the study of sanctions. The costs of rejection can be both economic or political in nature, with the highest political cost for the authoritarian ruler being the loss of power. The graph below (Figure 1) illustrates the circumstances under which we would expect a target to concede to or to reject the sender's demands. ECc is determined to a large extent by the credibility of the sender's threats (Hovi et al. 2005) ;
however, the nature of the sender's demand is equally important. The literature has distinguished between minor and major sanction goals (Drury and Li 2006; Hufbauer et al. 2007 ).
Minor goals have a low ECc, whereas major goals have a higher ECc. Analyzing the Chinese case, Drury and Li (2006) argued that targets are more likely to give in to sanction threats when the goals are minor.
Sanctions research has also dealt with varying sanction costs for senders and how these costs influence the selection of targets as well as the sanctions' prospects of success (Eaton and Engers 1999; Jing et al. 2003; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Simon 1995 When talking about authoritarian regimes, there is no sanction category that introduces a higher cost of concession than those demanding democratization. The instigation of democratic reform represents a huge threat to the authority of authoritarian leaders as these leaders rely on various authoritarian measures to stay in power. The political costs to a military regime of introducing civilian rule, to a one-party regime of allowing political opposition, or to an electoral authoritarian regime of arranging free and fair elections are normally detrimental. Therefore, authoritarian rulers "resist political openings for as long as possible and seek to manage the process of transition only after it has been forced on them" (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 83) . 5
According to the logic illustrated in Figure 4 Note that we control for economic strength and further factors that characterize the target; see further discussion in the "Control Variables" section.
5 Arguing from a game-theoretical perspective, Smith (1995) also comes to the conclusion that only those sanctions with minor demands, which the target can concede to at minimal cost, will end at the threat stage. Based on the theory laid out above, we expect that democratic sanctions materialize more often than sanctions with other goals, despite their regime-threatening costs. The following two hypotheses follow from this discussion:
H1a: Democratic sanctions increase the level of democracy in authoritarian regimes.
H1b: Democratic sanctions increase the level of democracy in authoritarian regimes more than those sanctions aiming to achieve other goals.
Moreover, the increased frequency of democratic sanctions and the changed structural attributes of the international system in the post-Cold War era should affect the general demo- As outlined above, we believe that the positive relationship between sanctions and democratization is due to the higher frequency of regime-threatening sanctions in connection with democratic goals. In some cases authoritarian regimes might reevaluate the sender's demands and concede before they are ousted from office. When they do not, we expect greater regime instability to be associated with democratic sanctions, as in the case of Malawi's Hastings Banda. An irregular change in leadership or a change in regime type in response to sanctions does not always result in democratization, but it does open up space for political competition. If sanctions destabilize authoritarian regimes, they are also likely, on average, to increase the level of democracy. We therefore also test the following hypotheses:
H3: Democratic sanctions increase the likelihood of an irregular change in leadership.
H4: Democratic sanctions increase the likelihood of a change in regime type.
Data and Research Design
Methodologically, this study utilizes cross-sectional time-series analysis to investigate how sanctions affect democratization in authoritarian regimes. Much of the early sanctions literature, which has concentrated on the effectiveness of sanctions, has measured the dependent variable as a dichotomy (e.g. Hufbauer et al. 2007 ) where sanctions either succeeded in obtaining their intended goals or failed to do so. 6 These qualitative dichotomous judgments To account for changes in the level of democracy, we utilize a combined Freedom House and Polity IV score. Following Teorell (2005, 2007) , we adopt the combined score to compensate for the individual shortcomings of the two indices. 7 The combined score is derived by computing the average Freedom House political rights and civil liberties score (reversed and transformed to a 0-10 scale), and combining it with the revised combined autocracy and democracy score from the Polity IV data (also converted to a 0-10 scale). The change in the level of democracy is calculated as demot-demot-1.
As a supplementary test, we test whether democratic sanctions destabilize authoritarian regimes, and whether they do so to a greater degree than other sanctions. This (a) sheds light on how democratic sanctions work in authoritarian regimes and how they influence democratization and (b) substantiates our argument that democratic sanctions are particularly costly.
We run a series of conditional fixed-effects logistic regressions. One set of these models uses leader exit 8 as the dependent variable, and one uses regime change, as recorded in the Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman (2012) regime data set. 9
All authoritarian regimes that existed in the period 1990-2010 are included in the sample.
According to Hadenius and Teorell's (2007) classification, a country is regarded as authoritarian in a certain year if its democracy score is lower than 7.5 on the 10-point democracy index described above. The sample does not include any democratic regimes, except those that entered the democratic-regime category during a sanction episode. 10 Not including these cases 7 This combined FH/Polity IV outperforms all rival indices in an independent assessment (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) .
8
The variable is dichotomous and shows whether there has been a change in the national chief executive during a given year. Data is taken from Banks (2012) and has been updated for the years after 2006 (a similar source is the Archigos data set, see Goemans et al. 2009 ). The data has also been censored in those instances where leaders have changed due to death by natural causes (for example, Bahrain 1999) and where a leader has stepped down due to constitutional term limits (for example, Russia 2008). We do, however -in contrast to Chiozza and Goemans (2004) -include those cases where the president has stepped down due to term limits but where the chosen successor has lost to an oppositional candidate (see for example Kenya 2002).
9 A regime change is observed when a country transitions from one regime type to another (either to a different authoritarian regime type or to democracy). Regime change relates to the regime categories in Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman's (2012) regime data set, according to the regimeny categorization. The categorization distinguishes between 20 different regime categories.
10 These countries stay in the sample until the last year that sanctions were imposed. against an authoritarian regime were imposed in 532 of these country years.
Introducing a New Data Set on Post-Cold War Sanctions
To assess the impact of "democratic sanctions" on autocratic regimes, we need to clearly delineate them from other restrictive measures. In the following discussion we briefly introduce the main tenets of the new global data set on post-Cold War sanctions (Portela and von Soest 2012) .
The data set is composed of the entire universe of sanction regimes imposed by the UN, the US and the EU -the main sanction senders -in the period from 1990 to 2010, including those sanction regimes that were in place already in 1990 and those episodes which are still ongoing (see Appendix 2). Given that the investigation explores the impact of sanctions on authoritarian regimes, the data set does not list measures against democracies and also does not include sanctions directed at nonstate actors. It includes all countries subjected to sanctions that the Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman data set (2012) has coded as being "autocratic regimes" at the start of the sanction episode.
In contrast to the valuable TIES data set by Morgan, Bapat and Krustev Morgan et al. 2009 ), we only recognize imposed sanctions; we exclude threatened sanctions that have failed to materialize. This decision is based on the theoretical expectation, outlined above, that democratic sanctions potentially result in such extensive costs for autocratic rulers that these rulers cannot afford to concede at the threat stage. Doing so would effectively mean that they weaken themselves or even relinquish power.
For our purposes, we have to go beyond the commonly used data set from Hufbauer et al. (2007) . To start with, the Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (HSE) data set effectively stops assessing sanction cases as of 2005, and even for the cases before this date, the assessment is inconclusive. Secondly, and more importantly, we have to depart from their coding of the ending of sanction episodes. True, "the exact dates of onset and termination of sanctions episodes are often indistinct" (Hufbauer et al. 2007: 48-49 ), yet for our analysis it is important to demarcate the end of an episode as the point not only when the sanctions are lifted but also when the sender's goal changes substantially.
Thirdly, in contrast to HSE, in our data set we divide all goals into coherent categories.
We consider democratization to have been intended when the imposing documents or send- All of these demands severely limit rulers' leeway to apply autocratic means. While categories 1 to 5 deal with several practices that interrupt the democratic process, categories 6 and 7
reflect the imposition of sanctions in response to the breaching of human rights that are closely linked to the democratic process (Portela 2010) . Sanctions are also categorized as democratic when the sender expresses the explicit desire to bring about democratic regime change in the autocratic regime (see Table 1 ).
Adapting the model proposed by Charron (2011: 7-11 ; see also Hufbauer et al. 2007 : 52-55),
we classify the goals of sanctions according to broad categories. We differentiate between the following objectives:
1) democratization (as defined above),
2) the supporting of human rights, 11
3) the fight against narcotics, 4) the ending of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 5) the termination of bellicosities or the establishment of peace agreements, 6) the fight against terrorism. 12 Table 1 11 The democratization category contains the quest for those human rights directly connected to the democratic process, whereas this category includes all other human rights.
12 Establishing the main goals includes some subjective assessment based on the documents imposing sanctions, as well as further primary and secondary literature. (Pape 1997) .
Extending the existing large-N research, which has focused almost exclusively on economic sanctions, we include economic (for example, restrictions on exports and imports, aid sanctions), political (for example, restrictive measures to enforce other sanctions), military (for example, arms embargoes) and diplomatic (for example, the recalling of ambassadors) sanctions in the data set. For our intensity measure, we differentiate dichotomously between intense and nonintense sanctions. The key question for this differentiation is as follows: How likely is it that individuals other than members of the autocratic ruling elite ("innocents")
will be affected by the sanctions? The higher the probability, the higher the intensity of the measures. Table 2 shows which sanction types are coded as intense and nonintense measures. In contrast to Hufbauer et al. (1990 Hufbauer et al. ( , 2007 , Drury (1998) , Morgan and Schwebach (1997) and others, we do not estimate the economic costs of sanctions, as the welfare loss on the part of the target country -for instance, measured by the aggregate national product loss over time -is very difficult to attribute to sanctions due to multiple influencing factors (see also Pape 1997) .
We have transformed the data set into a cross-sectional time-series format that includes all authoritarian regimes for the period 1990-2010 ). The main independent variables in the analysis are 1) whether a country was subjected to sanctions in a given year and 2) whether sanctions with explicitly democratic goals were imposed.
Control Variables
The issuing of sanctions comes with costs not only for the target but also for the senders -for instance, export and import losses. Senders are thus less likely to introduce sanctions against richer and bigger countries and those well integrated in the global economy, since sanctioning such countries would yield higher economic costs for the sender (e.g. Lektzian and Souva 2007; Nooruddin 2002) . As these economic variables have also been associated with democratization and the stability of political regimes (Teorell 2010) , they must be included as controls in the statistical models.
Boix (2003) argues that smaller countries are generally more likely to democratize. In smaller countries capital holders are less afraid of democratization, since fixed assets can more easily be transferred out of the country. Our models hence include a measure of logged population size (Heston et al. 2009 ). 13 The democratization literature is inconsistent in its theoretical expectations of how trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect democratization (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Bollen 1983; Gasiorowski 1988 ). However, a cross-sectional time-series analysis by Li and Reuveny (2003) showed a significantly negative effect for both. More importantly, the economic integration or linkage of countries with the world market (Levitsky and Way 2010) might be a powerful predictor of how likely it is that a country will be subjected to sanctions in the first place. Some authors have argued that less integrated countries are more likely to face sanc-
tions (McLean and Whang 2010). FDI inflows and trade also point towards the stability of countries, with the expectation being that higher levels of FDI and trade indicate institutional
strength and high levels of regime stability (Williamson 2000) . We use the data from the World Development Indicators to account for FDI and trade in the models.
In accordance with classical modernization theory, we expect a positive relationship between the level of economic development and the level of democracy (Lipset 1959 ). However, making predictions for the dynamic settings tested in this paper is difficult. According to later versions of modernization theory, economic development does not increase the likelihood of democratization but rather decreases the risk of democratic breakdown and thereby increases regime stability (Przeworski et al. 2000) . For this variable we use data from the UCDP/PRIO data set .
Results
As stated in the theory section, democratization is only one of several goals set out by Western countries when they issue sanctions against authoritarian regimes. The theoretical argument in this paper suggests that the goal of sanctions should have important consequences for the democratic outcome. Democratic sanctions should be especially successful in improving the level of democracy in the targeted country. Table 3 below shows the democratic development among countries subjected to sanctions with varying goals. According to the theory of concession costs laid out earlier, the positive outcomes of democratic sanctions and peace sanctions are to be expected given that the concession cost in such cases would be high. The strong democratic development in cases of human rights sanctions is more surprising. However, their positive outcome might be a result of the fact that these sanctions often coexist with democratic sanctions. It is therefore interesting to see how this category performs in the control for democratic sanctions in the multivariate analysis. Cases where the five remaining categories of sanctions -sanctions to fight narcotics, sanctions to stop the development of weapons of mass destruction, sanctions to fight terrorism, sanctions to get countries to enforce sanctions against a third party, and sanctions against mistreatment of diplomats -were imposed all show less democratic development than cases where no sanctions were imposed. Admittedly, the number of cases for some of these categories is rather small; we therefore hereafter combine the narcotics, sanction enforcement and diplomat expulsion sanctions into a residual "other" category.
Since one sanction episode might be motivated by several goals and one country might be subject to sanctions imposed by multiple actors (sometimes with varying goals), we have to move away from bivariate analysis in order to control for potential confounding variables and overlapping sanction goals. The main analyses are displayed in Table 4 . Again, the dependent variable is the change in the combined Freedom House and Polity index. Hence, the dependent variable represents Di,t-Di,t-1, where D represents the level of democracy for country i and time t. All models use panel-corrected standard errors and a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to account for serial correlation (Beck and Katz 1995) . All independent variables, including sanctions, are lagged one year. Lagging the independent variables has important consequences for the results. Sanctions are often implemented as a result of drastic democratic decline, such as unfair elections or coup d'états. Therefore, the democratic development in the first year of a sanction episode is often more a cause than a consequence of the sanction. All models feature the same controls, but they vary in how they account for sanctions. All models have been checked for multicollinearity.
Model 1 shows the general effect of sanctions when we control for the usual independent variables. The results are remarkable given that previous research has shown a robust negative impact of sanctions on democracy (Peksen and Drury 2010) . Model 1 displays a positive, but insignificant, effect of sanctions on democratic development in targeted countries. Although this is certainly not enough evidence to claim that sanctions have a positive effect on democratization, it suggests that the previously acknowledged negative effect does not exist when we look at the post-Cold War period. However, when we look specifically at democrat- (Table 3) , they do not remain significant when we control for the democratic sanction type.
A potential problem with the results above could be that the democratic sanctions are generally more intense than sanctions imposed to obtain other goals. 15 In Table 5 , we therefore make the distinction between intense and nonintense sanctions and observe whether the variable remains significant when we control for these different measures. 16 Models 5 15 However, it is important to note that the literature on sanctions does not predict that intense sanctions are always more effective, and especially not when they are imposed on authoritarian regimes (Lektzian and Souva 2007) .
16 To reiterate Table 2 , nonintense sanctions include visa bans, asset freezes, diplomatic sanctions, military sanctions and arms embargoes. Intense sanctions include aid sanctions, commodity embargoes, financial sanctions and comprehensive trade embargoes.
17 Models 1-7 were also run using a fixed-effects regression model (see Beck and Katz, 1995 on the advantages of using panel-corrected standard errors). Changing model specifications had no substantive effect on the results. On the contrary, the positive effect of democratic sanctions was reaffirmed and the general sanction variable in Model 1 even became significantly positive with the fixed-effects specification. * = Significant at the .10 level; ** = significant at the .05 level; *** = significant at the .01 level. Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors within parentheses. All independent variables use a one-year lag. DM = democratization; HR = human rights; PC = peace; TR = terror; WMD = weapons of mass destruction; OT = other. Source: Authors' compilation.
Supplementary Tests on Sanctions and Regime Stability
The previous section has shown that democratic sanctions are associated with increased levels of democracy. In Section 2, we argued that the relationship between democratic sanctions and democratization is likely to be an effect of democratic sanctions being imposed despite the high or even potentially regime-threatening costs of rejection. As a supplementary test,
we have run a series of logistic regressions accounting for regime instability. Below we introduce models using irregular ruler exit and regime change as the dependent variables.
The models below are logistic regressions with conditional fixed effects. The fixed-effects specification is a strategy that can be used to account for country-specific omitted variables. 18
Following Marinov (2005) we use a fixed-effects model rather than an event-history model. 19 According to Beck et al. (1998) , when using cross-sectional time-series data with a dichotomous dependent variable of an event measured at discrete intervals, fixed-effects logit is technically equivalent to an event-history model. The models use largely the same control variables as the main regression models. In addition, the models for leadership exit introduce a control for the number of years a leader has been in office to account for natural replacements over time. 20 In the models for regime change, we include a variable accounting for the number of years a country has been categorized as a specific regime type (Table 6 ). This variable resembles a lagged dependent variable, and serves to capture regime stability up to that particular point in time.
The models above confirm our expectations that democratic sanctions induce irregular leadership exit and regime change. Model 8 reaffirms Marinov's (2005) finding that sanctions generally increase the probability of leadership exit. As Model 9 demonstrates, the relationship is stronger for the democratic sanctions than for the nondemocratic sanctions. 21 Looking at the models for regime change, we see no significant effect of sanctions generally (Model 10), but we find a significant effect for democratic sanctions (Model 11). These results support the argument that democratic sanctions can be a threat to the survival of authoritarian institutions.
In Guatemala (1993), for instance, the military ousted President Serrano, who had unconstitutionally dissolved parliament and the judiciary, after the US and its allies imposed sanctions on Guatemala. An interim president took over, and the country's democratic institutions were restored. In Nicaragua (1996) and Thailand (1993) , sanctions also contributed to regime change. However, democratic sanctions rarely create liberal democracies instantly; rather, they lead to limited multiparty regimes. In addition, democratic sanctions have different effects on autocratic rulers and regimes. In Peru, sanctions contributed to democratization without ruler change. When President Alberto Fujimori suspended the legislature and 18 A problem with the fixed-effects model is that it excludes all clusters without variation in the dependent variable (i.e., the most stable regimes). However, a Hausman test reveals that the unique errors are correlated with the regressors, hence suggesting that a fixed-effects model is preferable to a model using random effects (Greene 2002) .
19 To assess leader exit with their specification, Escribà-Folch and Wright (2010) ran multinomial logistic regressions.
20 Data is taken from the 2010 version of the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001) .
21
The models also show that a longer time in office increases the likelihood of change. This might seem like a peculiar result, but is a consequence of the fixed-effects estimation and the relatively short time period. The model only includes countries with at least one change in office and estimates the results within those clusters. intense sanctions decrease the likelihood of regime change in models 9 and 11. The intensity of sanctions has not been the main focus of this paper, but these results at least partially confirm Galtung's (1967) skepticism about the naive theory of sanctions.
It is not possible to offer comparative predicted probabilities on the basis of a conditional fixed-effects model (Wooldridge 2002 ), but as Marinov (2005: 572) argues, extracting the marginal change in the predicted probability for individual clusters in the models is desirable. 22 There is a clear difference in the predicted probabilities of both ruler change and regime-type change when democratic sanctions are imposed. Keeping all continuous variables at their means and all categorical variables at their mode, the average predicted probability for leader exit across all clusters in a given year rises from 0.169 without a democratic sanction to 0.448 when a democratic sanction is in place. The corresponding number for change in regime type is 0.254 without democratic sanctions and 0.442 when democratic sanctions have been imposed. There are several instances where regime change has been preceded by sanctions, although we would not argue that the relationship between sanctions and institutional change was causal in all these instances. Appendix 1 provides a full list of these instances. Changes in regime type rarely lead to full democracy, and sometimes countries transition from what could generally be perceived as a more democratic regime type to a less democratic one. However, most of the instances where change in regime type is preceded by democratic sanctions show signs of at least limited liberalization (such as the implementation of multiparty elections).
None of the models above have distinguished between different forms of authoritarianism. Earlier research has demonstrated the probability that different types of authoritarian regimes respond differently to sanctions (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010) . This paper's analysis has shown that the type of sanction is as important as the type of authoritarian regime the sanction is directed against. Authoritarian regimes tend to democratize and become less stable when they are subjected to sanctions with democratic goals. These results hold true even when we do not distinguish between different forms of authoritarianism.
Conclusion
Previous research on sanctions, which mostly focused on Cold War dynamics and economic sanctions alone, demonstrated that sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. Using a new data set that covers post-Cold War 22 Following Marinov (2005: 572) , we estimated the model as an ordinary logistic regression with country intercepts as dummy variables in the model. The model yielded very similar results to the conditional fixed-effects logit. Post-estimations were derived for every country using Long and Freese's (2006) Spost package for Stata.
Admittedly, the predicted probabilities are affected by the fact that only those series with at least one positive outcome are included in the models (therefore excluding the most stable cases). However, this adheres to both the baseline predicted probabilities and the probabilities associated with sanctions. analyses, we have generated more optimistic results, particularly for those sanctions that explicitly aim to achieve democratization.
Our -somewhat counterintuitive -theoretical argument is that this positive outcome of democratic sanctions can be attributed to the higher concession costs faced by the target for this particular sanction type. Conceding to democratic sanctions is especially costly to authoritarian regimes, because means such as vote rigging, interfering with the media and repressing the opposition are generally necessary for them to stay in office. In consequence, au- 
